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The Disciplined Historian: “Epistemic Virtue”, “Scholarly 
Persona”, and practices of subjectivation. A proposal for the 
study of Brazilian professional historiography
This paper discusses theoretical issues raised by studying 
Brazilian professional historiography through the concepts of 
“epistemic virtue” and “scholarly persona” as proposed by Her-
man Paul. Transitioning from 19th century Western Europe to 
late 20th century Brazil, or to any other historical situation, 
for that matter, might result in problems if one assumes these 
concepts are designed to explain only a specific historical si-
tuation. I try to solve such problems by situating both working 
concepts in relation to a broader horizon, that of the practice 
of subjectivation. In this sense, constellations of epistemic vir-
tues and the whole body of practices related to the scholarly 
self should be understood as instances of the broader games 
of power which establish the norms governing a specific field.
Palavras-chave: epistemic virtues; scholarly self; subjectiva-
tion; Brazilian historiography.
O Historiador Disciplinado: “Virtude Epistémica”, “Persona 
Académica” e práticas de subjectivação. Uma proposta 
para o estudo da historiografia profissional brasileira
Este artigo aborda aspectos teóricos levantados pelo estudo da 
historiografia profissional brasileira através dos conceitos de 
“virtude epistémica” e “persona académica” propostos por Her-
man Paul. A transição da Europa Ocidental do séc. XIX para 
o Brasil de finais do séc. XX, ou para qualquer outra situação 
histórica, pode revelar-se problemática se se assumir que estes 
conceitos servem para explicar apenas uma situação histórica 
específica. Procuro resolver esses problemas situando ambos os 
conceitos relativamente a um horizonte mais vasto, o da práti-
ca de subjectivação. Neste sentido, as constelações de virtudes 
epistémicas e todo o conjunto de práticas relacionadas com a 
identidade académica devem ser entendidos como instâncias 
de jogos de poder mais abrangentes, os quais estabelecem as 
normas que governam um campo específico.
Keywords: virtudes epistémicas; persona académica; subjecti-
vação; Historiografia Brasileira.
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The publication of important works such as L’Écriture de l’Histoire, 
by Michel de Certeau, Comment on Écrit l’Histoire, by Paul Veyne, in 
France, or Metahistory, by Hayden White, in the United States, can 
be considered a point from which it is no longer possible to ignore the 
fact that the historian’s careful, methodical craft is itself a product of 
historical circumstances.1 Whether historians are now more conscious 
of the limits of their work remains an open question. In Brazil, at least, 
there have been many texts published in recent decades proclaiming 
“revolutions” in professional historiography and attempting to assess 
the state of the field based mainly on anecdotal evidence or personal 
experience.2 Even what could be the only systematic and almost ex-
* PhD student at the São Paulo State University (Unesp) and guest researcher at Leiden 
Universy (oharajrm@gmail.com).
1 To the point that these books are still read in most historical theory courses in Brazil. Of the 
three cited, Metahistory was the last one to be translated and published in Brazil. The recep-
tion of these books is still to be more thoroughly studied.
2 For only a few examples, see Maria Helena Rolim Capelato, Raquel Glezer, and Vera Lucia 
Amaral Ferlini, “Escola Uspiana de História,” Estudos Avançados 8, n. 22 (1994): 349-58; Luzia 
Margareth Rago, “As Marcas da Pantera: Michel Foucault na Historiografia Brasileira Contem-
porânea,” Anos 90 1, n. 1 (1993): 121-43; Luzia Margareth Rago, “O Efeito-Foucault na Histo-
riografia Brasileira,” Tempo Social 7, n. 1-2 (1995): 67-82; Ronaldo Vainfas, “História Cultural 
e Historiografia Brasileira,” História: Questões & Debates 50 (2009) 217-35. In a later article, 
Rago writes a much more elaborate account of Brazilian professional historiography, even if it 
is still far from being a systematic study. See Luzia Margareth Rago, “A ‘Nova’ Historiografia 
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haustive study of Brazilian professional historiography in the 1980s 
falls short of delivering more than a shallow census of the profession, 
presenting simple data tables as “statistics”.3 In this sense, the recent 
qualitative and quantitative growth of projects and publications on the 
history of historiography in Brazil is a good sign.4
From all of the possible approaches available to those with profes-
sional historiography as their research object, I would like to discuss 
a particular approach based on a proposal made by Herman Paul in 
2011.5 He argues that after having made historical texts the central 
object of their reflections for at least five decades, those working in 
historical theory, the philosophy of history, and the history of histori-
ography would do well to turn to the practical dimension of the histo-
rian’s work. His proposal, then, is to study the “doings” of historians in 
relation to the exercise of “epistemic virtues” and the cultivation of a 
“scholarly self” by reference to “scholarly personae”.
The concept of “epistemic virtue” refers to the dispositions, skills, or 
habits that an individual must possess, cultivate, and/or exercise in order 
to be able to arrive at what could be loosely defined as knowledge. For ex-
ample, one should practice intellectual humility in order to be prepared for 
being wrong, or to consider other arguments without prejudice. For episte-
mologists this is mostly a matter of finding out what these virtues might be 
in an abstract, universal way, but such an approach is of little use to histo-
rians. Following Paul, I argue that what matters is to analyze how different 
virtues or sets of virtues are mobilized at different times and by different 
Brasileira,” Anos 90 7, n. 11 (1999): 73-96.
3 Carlos Fico and Ronald Polito, A História no Brasil (1980-1989): Elementos para uma Ava-
liação Historiográfica (Ouro Preto: Ed. UFOP, 1992).
4 For example, there is now a society for historians interested in the theory and history of 
historiography (Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e História da Historiografia), and there are at 
least three specialized journals, one of which, História da Historiografia, recently received the 
highest grade possible in the Brazilian national system of journal rankings, managed by the 
Ministry of Education. Also, the 2nd Conference of the International Network for Theory of 
History will be hosted in Ouro Preto in August 2016.
5 Herman Paul, “Performing History: How Historical Scholarship Is Shaped by Epistemic Vir-
tues,” History & Theory 50, n. 1 (2011): 1-19. Since then, Paul has published further important 
texts on this subject, one of the most recent being Herman Paul, “What Is a Scholarly Persona? 
Ten Theses on Virtues, Skills, and Desires,” History & Theory 53, n. 3 (2014): 348-71.
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groups in order to set standards by which one could “produce knowledge”.
But while those virtues can be more or less specifically defined 
by individuals in their particular fields by reference to how practicing 
individual virtues may lead to better results, the concept of the “schol-
arly persona” is more difficult to grasp. The scholarly persona is better 
understood at the level of an ideal type, an abstraction that may not be 
seen in its purest form in the “real world”, but nevertheless has heuristic 
value by helping to explain certain patterns in historical data. In this 
sense, even when we deal with a historiographical field in which a cer-
tain set of epistemic virtues may be commonly accepted, those virtues 
may be arranged in such different ways, and combined with such differ-
ent non-epistemic characteristics, that we may say there are different 
scholarly personae to which individuals in a field may relate to produce 
their scholarly selves. For example, in my own research I look at how 
professional (academic) historians mobilize axiological language not to 
refer to books and texts, but to the qualities of people, establishing 
what it would be desirable for a historian to be.
In this paper I would like to discuss these two concepts as part of 
a broader horizon – that of subjectivation6 practices. In other words, I 
would like to consider the cultivation of a scholarly self and the prac-
tice of epistemic virtuous behavior as instances of a more general set of 
practices which aim at constructing a subject which is able to perform a 
given task – in our case, to “faire l’histoire”.7 In the first part of the text 
I will sketch working definitions for the concepts epistemic virtue and 
6 Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg have discussed the terms assujettissement and subjecti-
vation, which they translate as subjectification and subjectivation, respectively. However, for 
this paper I would like to conflate these terms under the word “subjectivation”, not only for the 
sake of simplification, but also because I understand assujettissement in Foucault to be grasp-
ing an inherent tension between disciplinary powers and the possibility of “being conducted 
otherwise”. In other words, the argument I advance in this paper considers both discipline 
and self-fashioning as instances of production of subjectivity. For Milchman and Rosenberg, 
see Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, “The Final Foucault: Government of Others and 
Government of the Self,” in A Foucault for the 21st Century: Governmentality, Biopolitics and 
Discipline in the New Millenium, ed. Sam Binkley and Jorge Capetillo (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009), 62-71.
7 In this sense, it is possible to locate our research in relation to the question posed by Michel 
de Certeau many years ago: “Que fabrique l’historien, lorsqu’il ‘fait de l’histoire’?” Michel de 
Certeau, L’Écriture de l’Histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 63.
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scholarly persona, pointing to the differences between what could be 
called the historical and philosophical uses of these concepts. Thereafter 
I will arrive at the core of my argument: that this whole body of pre-
scriptive dispositions, which a field can and effectively does use, is part 
of a broader machinery to produce subjectivity. In other words, I adopt 
Michel de Certeau’s insight that a work of history is more like a product 
at the end of a production line than the output of the individual who 
signs as its author.8 Studying the formation of scholarly selfhood as an 
instance of subjectivation should allow one to address historical situa-
tions other than that of European professional historiography during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, as illustrated by reference to my own 
research on late 20th century Brazilian professional historiography.
“EpistEmic VirtuE” and “scholarly sElf”
In a text published in 2011, Herman Paul argued that philosophers of 
history and historians of historiography should expand their territo-
ries to include the practical dimension of the historian’s work. From 
Hempel to White, history was treated like a final product, ready for 
inspection, and it was the theorist’s job to assess it, or describe how it 
worked, or should work – first with historical explanation, then with 
historical narrative. Paul’s proposal was that we should also study his-
tory writing as performance, as a practice.
Historians bending over ancient documents carefully 
removed from gray folders in brown archival boxes, or writ-
ing a draft of a journal article, are engaged in performative 
activities. They read, select, associate, interpret, define, and 
formulate, not to mention a dozen other activities, which 
they undertake often simultaneously, often unreflectively, 
and often, perhaps, in less than full conformity to what 
8 “Comme la voiture sortie par une usine, l’étude historique se rattache au complexe d’une 
fabrication spécifique et collective bien plus qu’elle n’est l’effet d’une philosophie personnelle 
ou la résurgence d’une ‘réalité’ passée. C’est le produit d’un lieu.” Certeau, L’Écriture de l’His-
toire, 73. Italics in the original.
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their methodology textbooks once told them to do.9
Analyzing historians’ practices would require a different set of 
concepts, a new framework different from those of the discussions re-
garding historical texts. Both the concepts of epistemic virtue and 
scholarly persona aim to address these issues. Although they have dif-
ferent origins, Paul argued they could be articulated in order to provide 
a framework for questioning the rules by which historians play when 
doing their work.
The concept of epistemic virtue comes from the discussions of 
epistemologists regarding the properties of individuals engaged in cog-
nitive activities. Virtue epistemologists argue that in order to know 
something one needs to possess or exercise certain dispositions or at-
tributes. In this sense, virtue epistemology is the branch of epistemol-
ogy which aims at discussing what those characteristics would be and 
how they could be of help in the justification of knowledge.10 This 
approach constitutes what I would like to call the philosophical use 
of the concept: its main objective is to discover, describe, and discuss 
epistemic virtues as universal, abstract entities; its main question is 
“what dispositions, skills, or faculties can help an individual to know 
something?”
In contrast, what I call historical use has a distinctive histori-
cist flavor. Here, the task is not to come up with an exhaustive list of 
epistemic virtues and discuss why they should count as virtues, but 
9 Paul, “Performing History,” 3.
10 I will not discuss here the main internal debates in virtue epistemology, such as the relia-
bilist-responsibilist divide. For more on virtue epistemology see Abrol Fairweather and Linda 
Trinkaus Zagzebski, eds. Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility 
(Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 2001); Michael R. DePaul and Linda Trinkaus Zagze-
bski, eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford (UK): Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Robert Campbell Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An 
Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 2007); Heather D. 
Battaly, ed. Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); John Gre-
co, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity (Cambridge 
(UK): Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jason S. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual 
Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 2011); Tim Henning 
and David P. Schweikard, eds. Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic 
Virtues to Work (London: Routledge, 2013); Abrol Fairweather, Virtue Epistemology Natural-
ized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (New York: Springer, 
2014); Mark Alfano, ed. Current Controversies in Virtue Theory (New York: Routledge, 2015).
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to describe and analyze how different characteristics are considered 
virtuous in different contexts.11 In this sense, the main objective of the 
historical use of the concept of epistemic virtue is to study how, in 
different contexts, cognitive tasks were thought to require certain dis-
positions in order to be executed. So, for those historians or theorists 
of historiography inclined to accept Paul’s proposal and to focus on 
historians’ practices, the concept of epistemic virtue should be of great 
importance. It allows for the establishment of a framework according 
to which they can describe how historians assess their peers and their 
peers’ work as historians.12
Methodology manuals are full of virtue language, describing how 
historians should or should not behave in this or that situation. As Paul 
argues, “The idea that a historian’s ‘doings’ can be conceptualized in 
terms of virtues and vices would hardly have surprised such methodology 
textbook authors as Charles Victor Langlois, Charles Seignobos, John 
Martin Vincent, and Marc Bloch.”13 Such axiological language would also 
appear in obituaries, letters, and book reviews. In assessing their peers, 
it was (and still is) not uncommon for historians to engage as much in an 
evaluation of their conduct as in the content of their work.14
The concept of the scholarly persona is, in a certain way, an ex-
11 Paul recognizes this distinction between philosophical and historical use, and specifically 
discusses some problems entailed by such a relativistic approach in Herman Paul, “Weak 
Historicism: On Hierarchies of Intellectual Virtues and Goods,” Journal of the Philosophy of 
History 6, n. 3 (2012): 369-88. Still, his published works all point towards a historical use of 
the concept, in the sense that he mainly describes how different kinds of historians consider 
different characteristics to be virtuous or not in different contexts.
12 These practices of evaluation should also point us towards a better understanding of the 
functioning of power in the scholarly environment, as the criteria of evaluation are intrinsically 
tied to different hierarchies of epistemic virtues and epistemic goals. See Paul, “Weak Histori-
cism”.
13 Paul, “Performing History,” 5.
14 See for example Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, “Inventing the Archive: Testimony and Virtue in 
Modern Historiography,” History of the Human Sciences 26, n. 4 (2013): 8-26; Pieter Huistra, 
“The Trial of Henry of Brederode: Historians, Sources and Location under Discussion in 19th-
Century Historiography,” History of the Human Sciences 26, n. 4 (2013): 50-66; Herman Paul, 
“The Heroic Study of Records: The Contested Persona of the Archival Historian,” History of 
the Human Sciences 26, n. 4 (2013): 67-83; Herman Paul, “Manuals on Historical Method: A 
Genre of Polemical Reflection on the Aims of Science,” in The Making of the Humanities: The 
Modern Humanities, ed. Rens Bod, Jaap Maat, Thijs Weststeijn (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2014), 171-82.
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pansion of the former concept. A scholarly persona is a set of epistemic 
and non-epistemic characteristics in relation to which one cultivates, 
exercises, or subverts, represses, in order to be recognized as a scholar. 
In other words, the scholarly persona is an abstraction that allows us 
to recognize how certain social roles are perceived to have a distinct 
persona that can be recognized by certain general features. Paul relates 
his concept to that of the “scientific persona” described by Lorraine 
Daston and Otto Sibum,15 and to the reflections on the “persona of the 
philosopher” by Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter.16 
But there are important distinctions to make in relation to both those 
projects. For Daston and Sibum, the persona is something much more 
abstract and less susceptible to historical fluctuations; their interest in 
the scientific persona is focused on much larger time scales and with 
much broader generalizations. They are also not interested in non-
epistemic factors, taking for granted that one’s aim should always be 
knowledge, without considering any other possible motivations.17 For 
Condren et al., on the other hand, each philosophical school would en-
gage in disputing the characteristics of the persona of the philosopher. 
In this sense, they frame distinctions between schools of thought as 
disputes between “ways of being a philosopher”, rather than between 
substantive differences in the content of their doctrines, bringing an 
important political dimension to his inquiry. Personae are, in this ap-
proach, much less general, and require a much shorter time frame in 
order to be studied.
The scholarly persona, as proposed by Paul, seems to deal with 
15 Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum, “Introduction: Scientific Personae and Their Histories,” 
Science in Context 16, n. 1-2 (2003): 1-8.
16 Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter, eds. The Philosopher in Early Modern 
Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2006).
17 While such an abstract and general approach might be attributed to the text in question 
being a thematic issue introduction, I would like to argue that later works by Daston might 
support my reading of “Scientific Personae and Their Histories”. See, for example, Lorraine 
Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Cambridge (US): The MIT Press, 2007) and Lorraine 
Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck, Histories of Scientific Observation (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2011). Other than that, Condren et al. and Paul are also working with the 
definition of a research agenda, making these understandings of the concept of persona quite 
comparable.
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a greater level of generalization than Condren et al., but it is still far 
from that of Daston and Sibum. Not every historiographical current 
might have its own prescriptive notions the way philosophical schools 
did, like Condren et al. argue, and not every historiographical dispute 
entails different “ways of being a historian”, although some of them 
might do. On the other hand, it would not be particularly enlightening 
to look for the lowest common denominator for all historians over two 
or three centuries, as in Daston and Sibum’s proposal. Being much less 
formalized than other, harder sciences, history seems to provide histo-
rians with much more space for their individual idiosyncrasies than, for 
example, physics. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that 
there are no more or less general rules governing different “ways of be-
ing a historian” in certain contexts. To describe such rules, to analyze 
the disputes between what different groups regard as qualification to 
be a proper historian – and also proper history – this is the task aimed 
at by inquiring into the scholarly persona.
As I said earlier, the scholarly persona is not only about epistemic 
values, but also about non-epistemic ones. As such, it is possible to de-
scribe not only epistemic virtues or goals (such as open-mindedness or 
historical understanding, respectively), but also what have long been 
considered to be “external factors” to the production of knowledge. From 
financial incentives to career advancement, the concept of scholarly per-
sona allows the questioning of non-epistemic motivations for doing his-
tory – what Paul calls desires.18 Some useful examples include historians 
strongly connected to religious institutions or to political causes, and the 
way in which such engagements do not necessarily produce “distorted” 
historical accounts, but raise questions about “ways of being a historian”. 
These questions revolve around differences in the conduct of historians 
rather than the content of historical texts. In sum, one constructs his or 
her own scholarly self by reference to different constellations of epistemic 
and non-epistemic values available at specific times and places.
With the legitimacy of history written by professional historians 
18 Paul, “What is a Scholarly Persona?,” 362-5 and 367-9.
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recently being questioned in Brazil and in other parts of the world, one 
might at least take into consideration the idea that “what historians 
do” is not an obvious category anymore – if it ever was.19 Both this 
questioning of historians’ authority over the past and of their monopoly 
over what can or should be said about the past should be more than 
enough evidence to disrupt the supposedly homogeneous and consen-
sual figure of “the historian”. Paul’s proposal enables us to do that.
practicEs of subjEctiVation
One might legitimately ask how one can justify applying such concepts 
to 20th century Brazilian historiography. Although such a question 
would miss the fact that Paul himself mentions 20th century examples 
in his theoretical papers,20 I would like to answer this hypothetical 
question by presenting my central thesis: the phenomena that both 
concepts of “epistemic virtue” and “scholarly self” allow us to grasp are 
part of a broader machinery of subjectivation, and as such, it is pos-
sible to explore the instances of this machinery in different times and 
places, thus allowing for a wide variety of historical situations to be 
investigated.21
What I understand to be the “machinery of subjectivation” is a 
set of discursive formations which are responsible for establishing the 
rules according to which one may occupy a subject position. These 
machineries have been studied by Michel Foucault in different books, 
such as Surveiller et Punir and La Naissance de la Clinique, where 
19 I refer here to the recent Comissão Nacional da Verdade (National Commission of Truth), 
which was responsible for extensive research into and the production of a long report regarding 
crimes against humanity committed by the Brazilian state during military dictatorship. There 
was no historian among the Commission’s major associates and its aim to “uncover historical 
truth” was questioned as partisan by many in Brazil. Furthermore, a recent proposal to regu-
late the profession of “historian” raised concerns from many people, including fellow historians, 
who see such regulation as unnecessary and even dangerous. The national association of histo-
rians in Brazil (ANPUH) supports the proposal.
20 For example, in Paul, “Performing History,” 5.
21 I would not like to suggest that Paul shares or agrees with such a view on the relationship 
of scholarly selfhood and subjectivation. Although he mentions Foucault en passant in one 
paper, I am not sure he would absolutely agree with my own interpretation and appropriation 
of his proposal.
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knowledge and power intertwine to construct the figures of the delin-
quent, the sick, or the doctor.22 The subject position of the doctor is 
of particular interest here: the individual signing the papers does not 
matter so much as the position he/she embodies. The doctor is a figure 
of knowledge and power, and in order to occupy such a position, to 
play such a role, has to adhere to certain discursive rules of conduct; 
the doctor must learn the techniques to read the body of another and 
embody the “medical gaze”. The doctor too is the product of a machin-
ery of subjectivation. In another instance, Foucault studied what he 
called “the care of the self”: techniques one could perform in order to 
know oneself and become another.23 While some saw this last turning to 
the self as the return of the modern subject, I would like to argue that 
the care of the self is nothing more than another instance of subjec-
tivation. Believing in a simple opposition between “subjectivation” on 
the one hand and “freedom” on the other makes the whole Foucauldian 
questioning of power void. Freedom is not equal to the absence of sub-
jectivation, but the possibility of “being conducted otherwise”, and of 
establishing a critical attitude towards the world.24
By this production of subjectivities the practitioners of certain 
academic disciplines are disciplined. They learn concepts and read cer-
tain texts considered important by their fields, but they also learn how 
to be historians. Like the doctors Foucault studied, historians learn the 
art of the “historical gaze”. They learn what is considered epistemically 
virtuous – should they pursue absolute precision in source criticism 
or should the final narrative take precedence over factual accuracy? – 
but also what kind of non-epistemic factors should matter – what role 
22 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); Mi-
chel Foucault, Naissance de la Clinique (Paris: PUF, 1963).
23 Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds. Technologies of the Self: A 
Seminar with Michel Foucault (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); Michel Fou-
cault, L’Herméneutique du Sujet. Cours au Collège de France (1981-1982) (Paris: Gallimard/
Seuil, 2001); Michel Foucault, Le Gouvernement de Soi et des Autres. Cours au Collège de 
France (1982-1983) (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2008).
24 See, for example, Michel Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population. Cours au Collège de 
France (1977-78) (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004); Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lu-
mières?” in Daniel Defert, François Ewald, ed., Dits et Écrits, v. IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 
562-78; Michel Foucault, Qu’est-ce que la critique? (Paris: Vrin, 2015).
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should the nation, or classes, or gender play in history?25 From then 
on, not only have they acquired specific cognitive skills, but also non-
epistemic references in relation to which they position themselves as 
historians – politically, ethically, and aesthetically.26
In this sense, telling the story of scholarly selfhood in professional 
historiography is describing different configurations of this machinery 
responsible for producing a subjectivity which is able to “tell something 
about the past”. What were the different epistemic virtues required of 
historians to do history of a certain kind? What kind of incentives did 
they have in order to work in this and not that field? What were the 
non-epistemic motivations for the rise in this or that kind of history? It 
is at once a study of the conditions of the possibility of professional his-
toriography (its social place) and of the long process by which one can 
acquire certain traits which enable one to “be a historian” (the prac-
tices). As Certeau put it a long time ago, “Telle est la double fonction 
du lieu. Il rend possibles certaines recherches, par le fait de conjonctures 
et de problématiques communes. Mais il en rend d’autres impossibles; 
il exclut du discours ce qui est sa condition à un moment donné; il 
joue le rôle d’une censure par rapport aux postulats présents (sociaux, 
économiques, politiques) de l’analyse.”27 The social place of history is, 
then, the point at which we may grasp this machinery in action – where 
one tries to mold his or her scholarly self by reference to a repertoire of 
scholarly personae available in his or her historical situation.
This conceptual architecture allows us to work with context as 
diverse as 19th century Europe and 20th century Brazil. The category of 
“practices of subjectivation” is abstract enough to serve as a reference 
for our analysis in different contexts, but is also defined by certain rules 
of procedure so that it does not allow us to “say whatever we want”. In 
other words, it provides us with a problem in the genealogical sense, 
25 They might also learn early that those same non-epistemic factors may either open “new and 
exciting” professional opportunities or make them completely inaccessible.
26 See, for example, Herman Paul, “Manuals on Historical Method” and Herman Paul, “What 
is a Scholarly Persona?”
27 Certeau, L’Écriture de l’Histoire, 78. Italics in the original.
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that is, a specific question to be answered by reference to different his-
torical instances.28
mEthodological issuEs
In order to be able to engage in such an enterprise, it is necessary to 
solve some methodological problems. What sources would one need in 
order to study the subjectivation of historians? And what would one 
need to look for in such sources? Paul’s sources are, as I mentioned 
earlier, mainly letters, obituaries, and manuals. These materials are 
common for the period he works with (19th century Europe), but not so 
common for others, like 20th century Brazil. With the late profession-
alization of history in Brazil, many of the methodology manuals used 
were translations from European manuals. Universities only became 
the main venue for historians by the second half of the 20th century, 
and most of the letters written by lesser known professors were not ar-
chived. Some universities have records of the courses taught in this pe-
riod, but the archives were not organized or even catalogued. To solve 
the problem of the lack of sources, I turned to book reviews.
Since the middle of the 20th century onwards, Brazilian profes-
sional historiography has mainly been based in universities. The mili-
tary dictatorship which ruled the country from 1964 to 1985 passed an 
extensive law reforming Brazilian higher education in 1968, and by the 
end of the 1980s it was possible to see the first results of the growing 
number of history departments with post-graduation programs.29 Up 
until 1981, only the University of São Paulo (USP) had a PhD program 
28 When I say “a problem in the genealogical sense”, I would like to refer to the specific 
instances where Foucault’s genealogy was criticized by historians on the basis of what they 
thought was “lacking in history”. The most well-known example is probably Jacques Léonard’s 
criticisms of Surveiller et Punir, specially how it ignored the French Revolution in its narrative. 
The point here is that genealogy pursues specific problems which do not necessarily require an 
exhaustive search for “more and more context”.
29 For a good overview of the higher education system in Brazil during the military dictator-
ship, see Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, As Universidades e o Regime Militar (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 
2014). For a narrower study of Brazilian higher education during the military dictatorship, 
much less critical to the military regime, see Luiz Antônio Cunha, A Universidade Reformada: 
o Golpe de 1964 e a Modernização do Ensino Superior (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2007).
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in history; between 1981 and 1986, four new PhD programs were es-
tablished, but these were still concentrated in the south and southeast 
regions.30 Despite this scenario, there were already some journals circu-
lating in the 1980s, and I was able to find useful material from these.
Although book reviews are usually evaluations of books, it is not 
uncommon for the reviewer to refer to the qualities of people rather 
than the qualities of books, or to the qualities of a text that can only 
exist because of the work done before the writing. A simple example 
is, “This book was based on extensive archival research, and updated 
bibliography”. A book can only be “based on extensive archival re-
search, and updated bibliography” if its writer carried out the necessary 
research and reading. If the reviewer thought this information was rel-
evant enough for it to be mentioned, even if only for the sake of conven-
tion, this says something about the sort of work a historian is supposed 
to do. This axiological language is important if one aims at describing 
the epistemic virtues a historian should demonstrate.
Such evaluative language also allows for solving the tension be-
tween what prescriptive manuals say and what historians “actually” 
do because book reviews evaluate the results of long research. As 
such, even if the conduct of the author or the reviewer contradicts 
what is said in methodology manuals, the way this assessment is 
made should be evidence of what is considered important. Not that 
these kinds of sources should be taken more seriously than the manu-
als, rather that they express different instances of the process of 
subjectivation – prescription and assessment. In other words, these 
sources are related to different aspects of this machinery, and should 
provide a foundation for us to understand different parts of the pro-
cess of subjectivation.31
30 Fico and Polito, A História no Brasil, 33.
31 Other useful sources for this kind of approach are those used by Paul himself – obituaries, 
letters, and manuals – but also any public debates or speeches, for they also frequently mobilize 
evaluative language. With that said, time and budget limitations restricted my own specific 
research focus to book reviews only.
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conclusion
Of course there are other possible approaches to the task of showing 
how the figure of the historian has been constructed in different con-
texts. In the Brazilian history of historiography one may find good 
works which deal with this subject.32 However, the concepts proposed 
by Herman Paul, which I have appropriated and tried to situate here 
in relation to a broader theoretical scheme, provide a promising frame-
work through which to understand how different “ways of being a his-
torian” can emerge or disappear.33
A whole body of mystical references is mobilized when historians 
talk about their own doings: hearing the voices of the past, the ghosts 
of the past, the archive as a place of contact with those who are no lon-
ger with us.34 The conceptual architecture I have discussed in this pa-
per aims at making those references understandable – not in the sense 
of unveiling a deeper, hidden truth, but in the sense of establishing 
the relationships these references had with what historians expected 
of their peers. This conceptual architecture should enable us to relate 
assertions like “Le bon historien, lui, ressemble à l’ogre de la légende. 
Là où il flaire de la chair humaine, il sait que là est son gibier”35 to a 
whole body of points of reference according to which such words can 
function. This is an attempt to write a history of historiography which 
is more than the chronicle of great names (usually male), writing great 
works, or of the succession of historiographical schools. Of course those 
32 See, for example, Angela de Castro Gomes, História e Historiadores (Rio de Janeiro: Edi-
tora FGV, 1996); Rodrigo Turin, “Uma Nobre, Difícil e Útil Empresa: o Ethos do Historiador 
Oitocentista,” História da Historiografia 2 (2009): 12-28; Maria da Glória de Oliveira, “Fazer 
História, Escrever a História: Sobre as Figurações do Historiador no Brasil Oitocentista,” Re-
vista Brasileira de História 30, n. 59 (2010): 37-52.
33 There is one paper from a Brazilian historian which tries to dialogue with Paul’s proposal. 
See Maria da Glória de Oliveira, “O Nobre Sacerdócio da Verdade: Reflexões sobre o Ofício do 
Historiador no Brasil Oitocentista,” Lusíada. História 9/10 (2013): 191-207. Other than that, 
Paul’s proposal has resonated mostly with Anglophone audiences.
34 Not only with Ranke, Michelet, or Guizot. See Michel de Certeau, Histoire et Psychanalyse 
(Paris: Folio Gallimard, 2002); Arlette Farge, Le Goût de l’Archive (Paris: Seuil, 1989). See 
also Jo Tollebeek, “ ‘Turn’d to Dust and Tears’: Revisiting the Archive,” History & Theory 43, 
n. 2 (2004): 237-48; Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, “Leopold Ranke’s Archival Turn: Location and 
Evidence in Modern Historiography,” Modern Intellectual History 5, n. 3 (2008): 425-53.
35 Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l’Histoire ou le Métier d›Historien (Paris: Armand Colin, 1974), 35.
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works have a place, but they should not be our only way of treating 
historiography historically.36
By studying how Brazilian historians have assessed the perfor-
mance of their peers, my research aims to show not only the values 
these historians cherished, or what kind of skills they needed for their 
work, but also the extent to which we should be mindful of how our 
own selves are affected by power today. In the spirit of the historical 
ontology of the present, the central point of this enterprise is not so 
much to exhibit “our professional forefathers” as relics of an ancient, 
dead past, but to enable us to think critically about our own “ways of 
being a historian”.
36 Here I would like to echo the concerns of Stefan Collini, “ ‘Discipline History’ and ‘Intellec-
tual History’: Reflections on the Historiography of the Social Sciences in Britain and France,” 
Revue de Synthèse 109, n. 3/4 (1988), 387-399.
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